Biometrics readers are deployed in many public sites and are used for user identification and verification. Nowadays, most biometrics readers can be connected to local area networks, and consequently, they are potential targets for network attacks. This article investigates the robustness of several fingerprint and iris readers against common denial of service attacks. This investigation has been conducted using a set of laboratory experiments and DoS attack generator tools. The experiments show clearly that the tested biometric readers are very vulnerable (...) to common DoS attacks, and their recognition performances deteriorate significantly once they are under DoS attacks. Finally, the article lists some security consideration that should be taken into consideration when designing secure biometrics readers. (shrink)

During each school semester, students face an onslaught of material to be learned. Students work hard to achieve initial mastery of the material, but when they move on, the newly learned facts, concepts, and skills degrade in memory. Although both students and educators appreciate that review can help stabilize learning, time constraints result in a trade-off between acquiring new knowledge and preserving old knowledge. To use time efficiently, when should review take place? Experimental studies have shown benefits to long-term retention (...) with spaced study, but little practical advice is available to students and educators about the optimal spacing of study. The dearth of advice is due to the challenge of conducting experimental studies of learning in educational settings, especially where material is introduced in blocks over the time frame of a semester. In this study, we turn to two established models of memory—ACT-R and MCM—to conduct simulation studies exploring the impact of study schedule on long-term retention. Based on the premise of a fixed time each week to review, converging evidence from the two models suggests that an optimal review schedule obtains significant benefits over haphazard (suboptimal) review schedules. Furthermore, we identify two scheduling heuristics that obtain near optimal review performance: (a) review the material from μ-weeks back, and (b) review material whose predicted memory strength is closest to a particular threshold. The former has implications for classroom instruction and the latter for the design of digital tutors. (shrink)

Fundamentalism was and still is a major threat to global peace and security. The modern world has shown itself to be vulnerable to this persistent threat. The emergence and growth of many fundamentalist cults in the last century, from fascism and communism to various types of religious fundamentalism, is sufficient proof of this point. This paper presents a philosophical investigation of fundamentalism and its specific relation to skepticism, and highlights the ineffectiveness of skeptical philosophies to prevent fundamentalism in human society. (...) Finally, it identifies a theoretical problem in modern thought which is at least partly responsible for the practical vulnerability of the modern world to fundamentalism, and discusses the possibility and necessity of a solution to fix that problem. (shrink)

BackgroundConsenting for retrospective medical records-based research (MR) and leftover tissue-based research (TR) continues to be controversial. Our objective was to survey Saudis attending outpatient clinics at a tertiary care hospital on their personal preference and perceptions of norm and current practice in relation to consenting for MR and TR.MethodsWe surveyed 528 Saudis attending clinics at a tertiary care hospital in Saudi Arabia to explore their preferences and perceptions of norm and current practice. The respondents selected one of 7 options from (...) each of 6 questionnaires.ResultsRespondents' mean (SD) age was 33 (11) years, 42% were males, 56% were patients, 84% had ≥ secondary school education, and 10% had previously volunteered for research. Respectively, 40% and 49% perceived that the norm is to conduct MR and TR without consent and 38% and 37% with general or proposal-specific consent; the rest objected to such research. There was significant difference in the distribution of choices according to health status (patients vs. companions) for MR (adjusted Kruskal-Wallis test P = 0.03) but not to age group, gender, education level, or previous participation in research (unadjusted P = 0.02 - 0.59). The distributions of perceptions of current practice and norm were similar (unadjusted Marginal Homogeneity test P = 0.44 for MR and P = 0.89 for TR), whereas the distributions of preferences and perceptions of norm were different (adjusted P = 0.09 for MR and P = 0.02 for TR). The distributions of perceptions of norm, preferences, and perceptions of current practice for MR were significantly different from those of TR (adjusted P < 0.009 for all).ConclusionsWe conclude that: 1) there is a considerable diversity among Saudi views regarding consenting for retrospective research which may be related to health status, 2) the distribution of perceptions of norm was similar to the distribution of perceptions of current practice but different from that of preferences, and 3) MR and TR are perceived differently in regard to consenting. (shrink)

With the advancement of internet and the emergence of network globalization, security has always been a major concern. During the trial operation, the management control platform discussed in this article included more than 600 network security vulnerabilities in the industry, with dozens of incidents, which were promptly dealt with and rectified, effectively improving the level of network security management and protection in the industry. As networks are very much vulnerable to denial of service attacks, much more emphasis has been given (...) to security. By improving their network security, network administrators have often tried their best. To attempt penetration testing, it is the best way of ensuring the system security. With the development of information technology, the security requirement of information system is increasing day by day. The use of penetration testing technology is conducive to the realization of accurate positioning, accurate detection, and active alarm of security vulnerabilities, and the optimization of monitoring and rectification of the combination of network security management control system. Taking penetration testing technology as one of the core elements of management and control, the risk index model is optimized to make network security management controllable and efficient, and effectively achieve management and control objectives. (shrink)

In order to correct the deficiencies of intrusion detection technology, the entire computer and network security system are needed to be more perfect. This work proposes an improved k-means algorithm and an improved Apriori algorithm applied in data mining technology to detect network intrusion and security maintenance. The classical KDDCUP99 dataset has been utilized in this work for performing the experimentation with the improved algorithms. The algorithm’s detection rate and false alarm rate are compared with the experimental data before the (...) improvement. The outcomes of proposed algorithms are analyzed in terms of various simulation parameters like average time, false alarm rate, absolute error as well as accuracy value. The results show that the improved algorithm advances the detection efficiency and accuracy using the designed detection model. The improved and tested detection model is then applied to a new intrusion detection system. After intrusion detection experiments, the experimental results show that the proposed system improves detection accuracy and reduces the false alarm rate. A significant improvement of 90.57% can be seen in detecting new attack type intrusion detection using the proposed algorithm. (shrink)

This study provides evidence regarding the level of ethical cognition of business students at the entry to college as compared to a national norm. It also provides comparative evidence on the effects of group versus individual ethical cognition upon completion of a business ethics course. The Principled Score (P-score) from the Defining Issues Test (DIT) was used to measure the ethical cognition of a total sample of 301 business students (273 entering students plus 28 students in a business ethics course). (...) The results indicate that (1) business students are not significantly different from the national norms at entry to college and (2) group reasoning helps male students improve their P-scores significantly in the business ethics course at a loss of P-score (albeit not statistically significant) for female students. (shrink)

The problem of finding optimal sampling schemes has been resolved in two models. The novelty of this study lies in its cost efficiency, specifically, for the applied problems with expensive sampling process. In discussed models, we show that some observations counteract other ones in prediction mechanism. The autocovariance function of underlying process causes mentioned result. Our interesting result is that, although removing neutralizing observations convert sampling scheme to nonredundant case, it causes to worse prediction. A simulation study confirms this matter, (...) too. (shrink)

From the early ninth century until about eight centuries later, the Middle East witnessed a series of both simple and systematic astronomical observations for the purpose of testing contemporary astronomical tables and deriving the fundamental solar, lunar, and planetary parameters. Of them, the extensive observations of lunar eclipses available before 1000 AD for testing the ephemeredes computed from the astronomical tables are in a relatively sharp contrast to the twelve lunar observations that are pertained to the four extant accounts of (...) the measurements of the basic parameters of Ptolemaic lunar model. The last of them are Taqī al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ma‘rūf’s trio of lunar eclipses observed from Istanbul, Cairo, and Thessalonica in 1576–1577 and documented in chapter 2 of book 5 of his famous work, Sidrat muntaha al-afkar fī malakūt al-falak al-dawwār. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis of the accuracy of his solar and lunar observations. (shrink)

Although informed consent is an integral part of clinical practice, its current doctrine remains mostly a matter of law and mainstream ethics rather than empirical research. There are scarce empirical data on patients’ perceived purpose of informed consent, which may include administrative routine/courtesy gesture, simple honest permission, informed permission, patient-clinician shared decision-making, and enabling patient’s self decision-making. Different purposes require different processes.

We introduce a new and time-efficient memory-encoding paradigm for functional magnetic resonance imaging. This paradigm is optimized for mapping multiple contrasts using a mixed design, using auditory and visual stimuli. We demonstrate that the paradigm evokes robust neuronal activity in typical sensory and memory networks. We were able to detect auditory and visual sensory-specific encoding activities in auditory and visual cortices. Also, we detected stimulus-selective activation in environmental-, voice-, scene-, and face-selective brain regions. A subsequent recognition task allowed the detection (...) of sensory-specific encoding success activity in both auditory and visual cortices, as well as sensory-unspecific positive ESA in the hippocampus. Further, sensory-unspecific negative ESA was observed in the precuneus. Among others, the parallel mixed design enabled sustained and transient activity comparison in contrast to rest blocks. Sustained and transient activations showed great overlap in most sensory brain regions, whereas several regions, typically associated with the default-mode network, showed transient rather than sustained deactivation. We also show that the use of a parallel mixed model had relatively little influence on positive or negative ESA. Together, these results demonstrate a feasible, versatile, and brief memory-encoding task, which includes multiple sensory stimuli to guarantee a comprehensive measurement. This task is especially suitable for large-scale clinical or population studies, which aim to test task-evoked sensory-specific and sensory-unspecific memory-encoding performance as well as broad sensory activity across the life span within a very limited time frame. (shrink)

The current doctrine of informed consent for clinical care has been developed in cultures characterized by low-context communication and monitoring-style coping. There are scarce empirical data on patients' norm perception of information disclosure in other cultures.

Clinical responses to dopamine replacement therapy for individuals with Parkinson’s disease are often difficult to predict. We characterized changes in MDS-UPDRS motor factor scores resulting from a short-duration L-Dopa response, and investigated how the inter-subject clinical differences could be predicted from motor cortical magnetoencephalography. MDS-UPDRS motor factor scores and resting-state MEG recordings were collected during SDR from twenty individuals with a PD diagnosis. We used a novel subject-specific strategy based on linear support vector machines to quantify motor cortical oscillatory frequency (...) profiles that best predicted medication state. Motor cortical profiles differed substantially across individuals and showed consistency across multiple data folds. There was a linear relationship between classification accuracy and SDR of lower limb bradykinesia, although this relationship did not persist after multiple comparison correction, suggesting that combinations of spectral power features alone are insufficient to predict clinical state. Factor score analysis of therapeutic response and novel subject-specific machine learning approaches based on subject-specific neuroimaging provide tools to predict outcomes of therapies for PD. (shrink)

Social entrepreneurship has received considerable recognition from universities in recent years. This study aimed to examine the mediating effect of the entrepreneurial social network on entrepreneurship education and social entrepreneurial intention of students at the university level. This study adopted a cross-sectional quantitative approach. A convenience sampling method was utilized to choose 392 students studying at the public and private universities in Chattogram, Bangladesh, who then completed a self-administered survey. The data were then analyzed through partial least squares structural equation (...) modeling. Results revealed a significant positive relationship between entrepreneurship education and students’ social entrepreneurial intention on the one hand and between entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial social network on the other hand. It was also found that entrepreneurial social networks had a significantly positive link with students’ SEIs. Furthermore, the study found that entrepreneurial social networks significantly mediate the relationship between entrepreneurship education and students’ SEI. Based on these outcomes, it is suggested to pay attention to entrepreneurship education further and strengthen the entrepreneurial social network to enhance SEI among students. Research findings have provided valuable insights regarding how entrepreneurship education can significantly impact SEI and emphasize the importance of entrepreneurial social networks as a mediator in social entrepreneurship. This study aims to contribute to the relevant social entrepreneurial literature by providing insights on practical issues related to the role of the entrepreneurial social network at the entrepreneurship education level. (shrink)

The most prominent form of human communication and interaction is speech. It plays an indispensable role for expressing emotions, motivating, guiding, and cheering. An ill-intentioned speech can mislead people, societies, and even a nation. A misguided speech can trigger social controversy and can result in violent activities. Every day, there are a lot of speeches being delivered around the world, which are quite impractical to inspect manually. In order to prevent any vicious action resulting from any misguided speech, the development (...) of an automatic system that can efficiently detect suspicious speech has become imperative. In this study, we have presented a framework for acquisition of speech along with the location of the speaker, converting the speeches into texts and, finally, we have proposed a system based on long short-term memory which is a variant of recurrent neural network to classify speeches into suspicious and nonsuspicious. We have considered speeches of Bangla language and developed our own dataset that contains about 5000 suspicious and nonsuspicious samples for training and validating our model. A comparative analysis of accuracy among other machine learning algorithms such as logistic regression, SVM, KNN, Naive Bayes, and decision tree is performed in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. The experimental results show that our proposed deep learning-based model provides the highest accuracy compared to other algorithms. (shrink)

Disclosure of near miss medical error (ME) and who should disclose ME to patients continue to be controversial. Further, available recommendations on disclosure of ME have emerged largely in Western culture; their suitability to Islamic/Arabic culture is not known.

To solve fractional delay differential equation systems, the Laguerre Wavelets Method is presented and coupled with the steps method in this article. Caputo fractional derivative is used in the proposed technique. The results show that the current procedure is accurate and reliable. Different nonlinear systems have been solved, and the results have been compared to the exact solution and different methods. Furthermore, it is clear from the figures that the LWM error converges quickly when compared to other approaches. When compared (...) with the exact solution to other approaches, it is clear that LWM is more accurate and gets closer to the exact solution faster. Moreover, on the basis of the novelty and scientific importance, the present method can be extended to solve other nonlinear fractional-order delay differential equations. (shrink)

Anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent mental disorders. Present treatments such as cognitive behavior therapy and pharmacological treatments show only moderate success, which emphasizes the importance for the development of new treatment protocols. Non-invasive brain stimulation methods such as repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct current stimulation have been probed as therapeutic option for anxiety disorders in recent years. Mechanistic information about their mode of action, and most efficient protocols is however limited. Here the fear extinction model can (...) serve as a model of exposure therapies for studying therapeutic mechanisms, and development of appropriate intervention protocols. We systematically reviewed 30 research articles that investigated the impact of rTMS and tDCS on fear memory and extinction in animal models and humans, in clinical and healthy populations. The results of these studies suggest that tDCS and rTMS can be efficient methods to modulate fear memory and extinction. Furthermore, excitability-enhancing stimulation applied over the vmPFC showed the strongest potential to enhance fear extinction. We further discuss factors that determine the efficacy of rTMS and tDCS in the context of the fear extinction model and provide future directions to optimize parameters and protocols of stimulation for research and treatment. (shrink)

In this study, we examine investor and firm response to the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010. The CTSCA requires large retail and manufacturing firms to disclose efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their supply chains and is a rare example of mandated corporate social responsibility disclosure. Based on a sample of 105 retail companies subject to the CTSCA, we find a significant negative market reaction to the passing of the CTSCA. Furthermore, we find that the (...) reaction is significantly more negative for larger firms and companies facing greater supply chain risks, suggesting that investors place a negative value on exposure to legitimacy threats in the social domain. With respect to company disclosure response, we document relatively high compliance with the legislation, although we also find that the disclosure response appeared to be more symbolic than substantive in nature. Finally, our analysis indicates that both disclosure choice and disclosure extensiveness were significantly higher for the high-supply chain risk companies, suggesting that the response was influenced by concerns with strategic legitimation. Overall, the limited quality of disclosure suggests that, without additional rules and guidance, mandates alone may not lead to meaningful social disclosure. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to assess the level of knowledge, attitude and practice of university teachers regarding plagiarism in Bangladesh. An online questionnaire consisted of 20 knowledge questions, 23 attitude items, and 18 practice questions was created using Google Forms. The link to the questionnaire was sent via email to university teachers. The total correct answers for knowledge and practice questions, and the total attitude score were converted to percentile scores and categorized accordingly as poor ( mean (...) + 1 SD). Bivariate analyses were conducted to compare the total knowledge, attitude and practice scores based on demographic and academic variables. Multiple linear regressions were used to identify the association between knowledge, attitude and practice scores, and other covariates. The findings revealed an average level of knowledge, attitude and practice regarding plagiarism among the majority of university teachers. The knowledge, attitude and practice scores were significantly higher for teachers who attended academic writing workshops compared to those who did not attend such events. Demographic and academic variables did not impact knowledge and attitude scores. However, the number of papers published in the last two years and their indexing in Web of Science (WoS) or Scopus significantly impacted attitude and knowledge scores. The multiple regression analyses showed that the practice score was significantly associated with age, highest education, and knowledge. (shrink)

Background The use of lengthy, detailed, and complex informed consent forms is of paramount concern in biomedical research as it may not truly promote the rights and interests of research participants. The extent of information in ICFs has been the subject of debates for decades; however, no clear guidance is given. Thus, the objective of this study was to determine the perspectives of research participants about the type and extent of information they need when they are invited to participate in (...) biomedical research. Methods This multi-center, cross-sectional, descriptive survey was conducted at 54 study sites in seven Asia-Pacific countries. A modified Likert-scale questionnaire was used to determine the importance of each element in the ICF among research participants of a biomedical study, with an anchored rating scale from 1 to 5. Results Of the 2484 questionnaires distributed, 2113 were returned. The majority of respondents considered most elements required in the ICF to be ‘moderately important’ to ‘very important’ for their decision making. Major foreseeable risk, direct benefit, and common adverse effects of the intervention were considered to be of most concerned elements in the ICF. Conclusions Research participants would like to be informed of the ICF elements required by ethical guidelines and regulations; however, the importance of each element varied, e.g., risk and benefit associated with research participants were considered to be more important than the general nature or technical details of research. Using a participant-oriented approach by providing more details of the participant-interested elements while avoiding unnecessarily lengthy details of other less important elements would enhance the quality of the ICF. (shrink)

Because ports are considered to be the heart of the maritime transportation system, thereby assessing port performance is necessary for a nation’s development and economic success. This study proposes a novel metric, namely, “_port performance index (PPI)_”, to determine the overall performance and utilization of inland waterway ports based on six criteria,_ port facility, port availability, port economics, port service, port connectivity, and port environment_. Unlike existing literature, which mainly ranks ports based on quantitative factors, this study utilizes a Bayesian (...) Network (BN) model that focuses on both quantitative and qualitative factors to rank a port. The assessment of inland waterway port performance is further analyzed based on different advanced techniques such as sensitivity analysis and belief propagation. Insights drawn from the study show that all the six criteria are necessary to predict PPI. The study also showed that port service has the highest impact while port economics has the lowest impact among the six criteria on PPI for inland waterway ports. (shrink)

Research has shown high levels of housing precarity among government-assisted refugees connected to difficult housing markets, limited social benefits, and other social and structural barriers to positive settlement. The COVID-19 pandemic has likely exacerbated this precarity. Research to date demonstrates the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for refugees and low-income households, including both health-related issues and economic challenges, that may exacerbate their ability to obtain affordable, suitable housing. In this context, we examined Syrian government-assisted refugees’ experiences during the pandemic, (...) asking: how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted Syrian refugees’ experiences of housing stability. To examine this issue, we interviewed 38 families in Calgary, London, and Fredericton. Using a qualitative descriptive methodology for analysis and interpretation, we found the liminality of settling as a GAR has been compounded by isolation, further economic loss, and new anxieties during the pandemic. Ultimately, for many participants, the pandemic has thwarted their housing stability goals and decreased their likelihood of improving their housing conditions. Based on our findings, we discuss potential policy and practice relevant solutions to the challenges faced by refugees in Canada during the pandemic and likely beyond. (shrink)

Nowadays, mobile telephony interruptions in our daily life activities are common because of the inappropriate ringing notifications of incoming phone calls in different contexts. Such interruptions may impact on the work attention not only for the mobile phone owners, but also for the surrounding people. Decision tree is the most popular machine-learning classification technique that is used in existing context-aware mobile intelligent interruption management model to overcome such issues. However, a single-decision tree-based context-aware model may cause over-fitting problem and thus (...) decrease the prediction accuracy of the inferred model. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an ensemble machine-learning-based context-aware mobile telephony model for the purpose of intelligent interruption management by taking into account multi-dimensional contexts and name it “E-MIIM”. The experimental results on individuals’ real-life mobile telephony data sets show that our E-MIIM model is more effective and outperforms existing MIIM model for predicting and managing individual’s mobile telephony interruptions based on their relevant contextual information. (shrink)

Southeast Asian landscapes have been shifting from natural landscapes to the modified landscapes at a rate faster than ever. Ecological integrity is under tremendous pressure due to the anthropogenic developmental activities. Little attention, however, has been paid to identify the major underlying causes of this rapid landscape transformation. This article discusses these issues from the point of view of a landscape ecologist. Landsat TM 30 m satellite images of 1988, 1996, and Landsat ETM+ 30 m image of 2005 were classified (...) using ERDAS Imagine 9.2. Vector-based Landscape Analysis Tools Extension software was used in analyzing landscape patterns. Landscape size and shape metrics have revealed that the main transformation occurred in the first period (between the years 1988 and 1996) which was due to the rapid extension of the commercial agriculture. However, in the second period (between the year 1996 and 2005), the main driver of rapid landscape transformation occurred due to the expansion of urban areas, transportation networks, housing, and township. The pace of developmental activities breaks all previous records at a faster rate in the second period as compared with the first. These findings will provide necessary information about the driving forces which have a potential use for sustainable management decision processes. Additionally, results and data on landscape patterns may help scientists, academics, and researchers in further study. They can also be of potential use for the sustainable management of natural resources, urban planning, and livable green cities. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, İslâm Eğitimi perspektifinden küresel vatandaşlık kavramıyla ilgili ilkeler ve uygulama alanlarını açıklığa kavuşturmayı hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca Kur’ân ayetleri ve hadislerde küresel vatandaşlığa yönelik değerleri destekleyen normları ve öğrenim çıktılarını belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Burada küresel vatandaşlık kavramı, bilişsel, duygusal ve davranışsal hedef alanları çerçevesinde din eğitimi derslerindeki örnek uygulama ve uygun konularla birlikte ele alınmıştır. Kur’ân ayetleri ve hadisler doğrultusundaki İslâm inanç ve ahlak ilkeleri, insanların gerek kendi toplumları içinde ve gerekse diğer toplumlar ile olumlu ilişkiler kurmasını teşvik etmektedir. Bu teşvikler (...) hem yerel hem de evrensel özellikler taşımaktadır. Bu yönde karşılaşılan örnek olaylar aynı zamanda İslâm inancının ve ahlak değerlerinin evrenselliğini yaşanmış olaylarla da örtüşecek biçimde yansıtmaktadır. Bu ilkeler aynı zamanda İslâm'ın inanç, ahlak ve hukukla ilgili özel konularının bir bütünlük çerçevesinde ele alınmasını sağlamaktadır. Küresel vatandaşlık konuları öncelikle eğitim felsefesinin genel ve özel amaçları doğrultusunda müfredat çerçevesinde hedef kitleye evrensel bir değer olarak kazandırılmalıdır. Bu konu okullarda eğitsel ve kültürel faaliyetler ile de desteklenmelidir.Özet: Küresel vatandaşlık kavramı bütün dünyada giderek yaygınlık kazanan önemli kavramlar arasında yer almaktadır. İnsanların ortak kimliğinin yanı sıra özellikle göçmen ve mülteci hakları konusu eğitim alanında ön plana çıkmaktadır. Son yıllarda ise uluslararası sorunların çoğalmasıyla birlikte bu konu güncelliğini arttırarak önemini sürdürmektedir. Günümüz toplumlarında karşılıklı hoşgörünün korunması için yapılan çeşitli boyutlardaki farklı çalışmalara ek olarak bu konunun örgün eğitim müfredatlarına dahil edilmesi de gündemdedir.Din eğitimi, küresel vatandaşlık konularını kapsayan başlıca dersler arasında yer almaktadır. Bu nedenle küresel vatandaşlık kavramının din eğitimi açısından temellendirilmesinin yanı sıra din eğitimi müfredatında bilişsel ve davranışsal eğitim metotlarını vurgulamak zorunlu hale gelmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, İslâmi eğitim perspektifinden küresel yaşama dönük eğitimin genel bir tasarımını oluşturmayı hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca dini kaynaklarda küresel vatandaşlığa yönelik değerleri destekleyen normları ve öğrenim çıktılarını belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır.İslâm eğitimi, dini farklılıklara saygı duymayı desteklemektedir. Ancak bu, diğer dinlerin inançlarının onaylandığı anlamına gelmemektedir. Burada, inanç özgürlüğü kapsamına başka dinlerin öğrenilmesi girmemektedir. Bu nedenle, kişinin inancına vurgu ve diğer dinler hakkında takınılan tutum ile farklı din mensuplarına saygı arasında herhangi bir çelişki bulunmamaktadır. Bu durum, Müslümanlar arasındaki mezhep farklılıklarına yönelik takınılacak tutumun nasıl olması gerektiğini de gözler önüne sermektedir. İslâm dünyasında eğitim politikaları çerçevesinde, uluslararası bilgiye erişimi sağlayan ve aynı zamanda özel hayatın korunmasını, kültürel işbirliğini ve birlikte yaşama değerlerini gözeten standartlarda bir müfredat hazırlanabilir. Özellikle İslâm dünyasını, küreselleşmeyle birlikte çeşitli kültürel sorunlarla karşılaştığından dolayı küresel vatandaşlık konusunda bilgilendirilmeye ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, yabancılaşmaya karşı öze dönüş, az gelişmişlik karşısında kalkınma ve adalet ile çatışmalar karşısında işbirliği bu yöndeki faaliyetlerin doğal sonuçları olarak okunmalıdır. Küresel vatandaşlık kavramı çeşitli araştırmalarda çok yönlü bir biçimde ele alınıp incelenmiş bir konudur. Bütün bu araştırmalardaki temel konular şöyle sıralanabilir: Dünya barışı, toplumlar arası işbirliği ve dayanışma, bireylerin ahlaki sorumlulukları, insan hakları ve hak ihlalleri, çok kültürlülük, çevre sorunları, evrensel düşünce ve bilginin dolaşımı. Bu makalede yukarıda adı geçen kavram ve konular İslâm kaynakları açısından değerlendirilip eğitim müfredatlarına ilişkin öneriler sunulacaktır. İslâm, küresel vatandaşlığın ilkelerini, barış, işbirliği, ahlaki sorumluluk, insan hakları, kültürel çoğulculuk, çevreyi koruma, düşünce ve bilginin evrenselliği konularını desteklemektedir. Tarihte İslâm medeniyetinin farklı coğrafyalarda sunmuş bulunduğu zengin tecrübe bu ilkelere dönük önemli bir ilham kaynağı olarak göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Bu ilkeler, eğitim müfredatlarına dahil edilip çok zengin öğrenim çıktıları kazandırılabilir.Kur’ân ayetleri ve hadisler doğrultusundaki İslâm inanç ve ahlak ilkeleri, insanların gerek kendi toplumları içinde ve gerekse diğer toplumlar ile olumlu ilişkiler kurmasını teşvik etmektedir. Bu teşvikler hem yerel hem de evrensel özellikler taşımaktadır. Bu yönde karşılaşılan örnek olaylar aynı zamanda İslâm inancının ve ahlak değerlerinin evrenselliğini yaşanmış olaylarla da örtüşecek biçimde çok iyi yansıtmaktadır. Toplumlar arasındaki bu evrensel değerlerin uygulamasında yerel farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. Bu farklılıklar etnik, ideolojik ve siyasi sebeplerden kaynaklanabilmektedir. Buna rağmen İslâmi değerler Müslüman toplumların ortak noktaları belirlemeye devam etmektedir. Başka ülkelere çeşitli sebeplerle göç etmiş Müslümanlarda da aynı durum geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Eğitim, ulusal ve evrensel değerleri kazandırmada en etkili araç olma özelliğini taşımaktadır. Bu konuyla ilgili değerleri kazandırmada İslâm eğitimi derslerinin önemi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Aynı zamanda vatandaşlık bilgisi, din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi derslerinin müfredatı da bu konuya katkı sağlamaktadır. Küreselleşme ve bilgi toplumu çağının şartları gereği, Müslüman toplumlar diğer toplumlarla olan ilişkilerinin sınırlarını belirlemeleri gerekmektedir. Yerellikten evrenselliğe geçişte karşılaşılan uyum zorlukları buna örnek olarak gösterilebilir. Coğrafi sınırların etkisinin giderek azalmasıyla birlikte artık vatandaşlık kavramı küresel hale gelmiş bulunmaktadır. İslâmın küresel vatandaşlığa bakış iki temel esasa dayanmaktadır. Bunlardan birincisi ortaklık ilkesi olup o da İslâm kültürünün diğer kültürlerle ilişkilerini geliştirmeye teşvik etmektedir. İkinci ise çok yönlülük taşıyan bütünsellik ilkesidir. Bu ilke benzerlikler ve farklılıklar arasında bir denge kurulmasına hizmet etmektedir. Bu ilkeler aynı zamanda İslâmın inanç, ahlak ve hukukla ilgili özel konularının bir bütünlük çerçevesinde ele alınmasını sağlamaktadır. Küresel vatandaşlığın getirdiklerinin yerel değerleri olumsuz yönde etkilememesi için gerekli önlemler alınmalıdır. Bunun için eğitim politikaları açısından bu konuların İslâm eğitimi dersleri müfredatı içinde yer alması ön görülmektedir. Bu müfredat toplum içindeki farklılıkları bir zenginlik olarak görüp kuşakları aynı potada eritmeyi sağlamalıdır. Aynı zamanda toplumlar arasındaki ilişkileri olumlu yönde geliştirmelidir.Küresel vatandaşlık konuları öncelikle eğitim felsefesinin genel ve özel amaçları doğrultusunda müfredat çerçevesinde hedef kitleye evrensel bir değer olarak kazandırılmalıdır. Bu konu aynı zamanda eğitsel ve kültürel faaliyetleri ile de desteklenmelidir. Bu konuda başarı sağlanabilmesi için eğitim planlayıcıları ve uygulayıcıları ortak hareket etmelidirler. Bu makalede küresel vatandaşlık kavramı, bilişsel, duygusal ve davranışsal hedef alanları çerçevesinde İslâm eğitimi derslerinde uygulaması bulunan örnek uygulama ve uygun konularla birlikte ele alınmıştır. Sonuç olarak küresel vatandaşlık değerlerine katkısı beklenen derslerin içerik analizlerinin gözden geçirilmesi ve öğrenim çıktılarının etkin biçimde izlenmesi önerilmektedir. (shrink)

Eşʿarîliğin son aşamasını temsil eden Îcî’nin argümanları, ekoldeki geleneksel ve felsefî yaklaşımları yansıtmaktadır. Bu makale Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî realizmine karşı kullandığı temel argümanlarını sunmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı Îcî’nin argümanlarını değiştirmeden sağlam bir şekilde sunmak, açıklamak, itirazları tartışmak ve sonunda güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini değerlendirmektir. Makalenin amacı Muʿtezile’nin argümanlarını açıklamak değildir; yine de Îcî’nin argümanlarını daha net anlamak için bazı açıklamalar yapmaktadır. Makalenin ilk kısmında Eşʿarîler ile Muʿtezile’nin ahlâk anlayışları arasında belirgin bir çizgi çizmektedir. Tartışma noktasını belirtip kelâmî argümanlar için zemin hazırlamaktadır. (...) Îcî’nin argümanları üç kısma ayrılmıştır. Birinci kısımda Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî temellerine şüphe düşürmek için insanın seçme özgürlüğünü ortadan kaldırmak için polemik argümanını sunmaktayız. Argümana karşı eleştirileri tartıştıktan sonra Îcî’nin insanın gücü ve seçme özgürlüğü konusundaki gerçek görüşünü ortaya koyuyoruz. İkinci kısım, intrinsik değerler görüşüne karşı üç argüman ihtiva etmektedir. İlk iki argüman Îcî tarafından benimsenmiş, üçüncüsü ise genel bir şekilde diğer Eşʿarîlere atfetmiştir. Bu iki argüman yalanı ve doğruyu söylemenin intrinsik etik değerleriyle ilgilenmektedir, üçüncüsü ise Eşʿarîlerin meşhur: “Bir araz başka bir araz üzerinde konamaz” deyişine dayanmaktadır. Makalenin son kısmı, Îcî’nin Muʿtezile'nin ahlâkî vecihler teorisine karşı argümanını tartışmaya ayrılmıştır. Îcî’nin argümanını tartışmadan önce teori ve taraftarları hakkında yeterli bir açıklama yapılmıştır. Ayrıca Îcî’nin ve Muʿtezile’nin ilâhî ahlâk anlayışına dair kısa bir giriş, argümanın içinde tartışılmaktadır. Adalet ve hikmet gibi bazı ilahî nitelikler Eşʿarî ve Muʿtezile’nin bakış açılarından ele alınmaktadır. Sonuç olarak makale, Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî realizmine karşı argümanlarını açık ve net bir şekilde ortaya koymakta, itirazları sunup değerlendirmekte ve argümanların güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini göstermektedir. Son olarak, Eşʿarîlerin Muʿtezile’ye karşı ahlâkî argümanlarını daha etkili bir şekilde anlamak için bir çözüm önermektedir. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt at re-examining the question of co integration and causality between money supply and inflation. As a first step we have used the statistical theory of integrated regresses to establish the time series properties of MI, M2, CPI and WPI economic series for Pakistan and then tested causality between money supply and inflation using Granger causality test. The result indicates that M,, M2, CPI and WPI are integrated of order one. Both M1 and M2 are co (...) integrated with CPI and WPI. The result also indicates that money supply cause inflation irrespective of whether it is represented by the CPI or WPI. It is also observed that inflation. cause changes in money supply, irrespective of whether it is measured as M1 or M2. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an increase in research conducted in the Middle East, with a corresponding increase in the challenges faced by members of the Research Ethics Committees. This study compares the structures of Omani and Jordanian RECs and investigates the perceptions of the challenges affecting the work of the REC members in Oman and Jordan. A convenience sample of 34 Omani and 66 Jordanian participants from 21 universities was recruited in this cross-sectional study. Almost 70% disagreed that (...) the members of RECs are unqualified, providing comments without justification; half believed that members have limited experience in research, and almost three-quarters that they have different opinions regarding some ethical issues. No significant differences were found between Omani and Jordanian REC members regarding their perception of the challenges, except for the perception that reviewing proposals is a time-consuming task and that multi-REC centres are less available. The regression model showed that there were significantly more male members of Jordanian RECs, and that Jordanian members were less likely to receive formal training. In conclusion, the current structure of RECs and the challenges faced by members need to be re-evaluated by decision makers to improve the overall quality of research activities, and to ensure that current REC members’ practices adhere to international standards. (shrink)

This study examines the influence of the COVID-19 crisis on academic expectations among international students from north-western China. According to past studies, academic expectations are multifaceted, making it critical to test the methods employed to assess this fundamental trait. The outbreak of COVID-19 has resulted in various significant changes in education, which have shifted from traditional to online or mixed formats. As a result, examining international students' academic expectations along with their interactions with adopted technologies is a topic that addresses (...) the current situation and issues. A mixed approach, comprising two different instruments, was followed to achieve this primary objective. While a survey with a questionnaire was undertaken with 551 international students, divided into two groups, ten students were interviewed during and after the lockdowns. The findings revealed that COVID-19 had a significant impact on the academic expectations of students as well as many elements such as training for employment, personal and social development, international student mobility, motivation, social pressure, and social interaction with the help of supporting technologies. In terms of gender, men outperformed women in motivation, social interaction, training for employment, and personal and social development factors. Similarly, as per the grade variable, the same higher trend was seen in postgraduates. Based on these findings, a set of recommendations was put forward. In the future, technology will be helpful in China's educational sector, such as online group collaboration, open education, managing student retention, and supervising teachers' recruitment. (shrink)

Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars have been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of this article is to suggest that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles change, both radically and fundamentally, between the early and (...) middle period dialogues. Though this is a kind of strengthening the developmentalistic approach corresponding the relation of the early and middle period dialogues, based on the fact that what is to be proved here is a essential development in Plato’ ontology and his epistemology, by expanding the grounds of development to the ontological and epistemological principles, it hints to a more profound development. The fact that the bipolar and split knowledge and being of the early period dialogues give way to the tripartite and bound knowledge and benig of the middle period dialogues indicates the development of the notions of being and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy before the dialogues of the middle period. -/- Keywords Plato; early dialogues; middle dialogues; being; knowledge; development -/- Introduction The differences between two groups of the early and middle period dialogues have always been a matter of dispute. Whereas the developmentalists like Vlastos, Silverman (2002), Teloh (1981), Dancy (2004) and Rickless (2007) think that from the early to the middle dialogues Plato’s philosophy changes, at least in some essential points, the unitarists like Kahn, Cherniss and Shorey believe that there happens no development and the differences must be taken as natural, ignorable and even pedagogic. In his well-known article, Socrates contra Socrates in PLATO, Vlastos lists ten theses of difference between two groups of dialogues. The first group which includes Plato’s early dialogues he divides to 'elenctic' (Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I) and 'transitional' (Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno) dialogues. These transitional come after all the elenctic dialogues and before all the dialogues of the second group which compose Plato’s middle period dialogues, including (with Vlastos' chronological order) Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus (1991, 46-49). Vlastos asserts strictly that his list of differences are 'so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotole’s' (ibid, 46). Vlastos’ list of differences between two Socrateses is considered a view breaking sharply between the early and the middle dialogues. Besides all ten differences between the two Socrateses in Vlastos’ list that can be supportive for our doctrine here, we intend to focus on some ontological as well as epistemological distinctions that have not completely been discussed hitherto. Contrary to the developmentalist theory of Vlastos, unitarian theory of Charles Kahn wishes to eliminate any substantial difference between the early and the middle dialogues. He distinguishes seven 'pre-middle' or 'threshold' dialogues including Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis and Euthydemus from the other Socratic dialogues which he calls 'earliest group' (1996, 41). The threshold dialogues, Kahn thinks, 'embarke upon a sustained project' that is to reach to its climax in the middle period dialogues, namely Phaedo, Symposium and Republic. Believing in that there is no 'fundamental shift'between the early and middle dialogues (ibid, 40), Kahn thinks the Socratic dialogues are just the 'first stage' with a 'deliberate silence' towards the theories of later periods (ibid, 339). One of the reasons of the surprising fact that Plato gives no hint of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Forms in the early dialogues, he thinks, is the pedagogical advantages of aporia. He thinks that Plato 'obscurely', and mostly because of education, hinted to some doctrines and conceptions in his early dialogues and with the aim of clarifying them only in the later ones (ibid, 66). The seven threshold dialogues, Kahn asserts, 'had been designed from the first' to prepare the pupils and readers for the views expounded in the middle period dialogues (ibid, 59-60). To show that the differences of the two Socrateses of the early and middle period dialogue are in their onto-epistemological grounds and thence cannot be explained by a unitaristic view, we try to draw the ontological and epistemological principles of the early dialogues in the first part below in order to show, in the second part, that those principles have been developed in the middle period dialogues. -/- A. The Onto-Epistemologic Principles of the Early Dialogues Socratic dialogues are paradoxical about knowledge because while being knowledge-oriented always searching for knowledge, they deny it and even never discuss it directly. Three elements of Socrates’ way of searching Knowledge throughout the early dialogues, i.e. Socratic 'what is X?' question, his disavowal of knowledge and his elenctic method combined together produce something like a circle which works, more or less, in the same way in these dialogues. Though this circle is an embaressing inquiry always resulting in ignorance instead of knowledge, its motivation is surprisingly Socrates’ passionate enthusiasm for knowledge, an intensive love of wisdom. The starting point of this circle is Socrates’ confession of having no knowledge which might be explicitly asserted or presupposed, maybe because it was one of the famous characteristics of Socrates; a confession always paradoxically accompanied with his intense longing for knowledge (e.g., Gorgias 505e4-5). Every time Socrates encounters with someone who thinks he knows something (οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι) (Apology 21d5) and tries to examine him. This examination seems to be the simplest one asking just what it is that he knows. Socrates’ elenchus, therefore, is always connected with 'what is X?' (τίς ποτέ ἐστιν) question, a question that most of the early dialogues of Plato are concerned with; 'what is courage?' in the Laches, 'what is piety?' in Euthydemus, 'what is temperance?' in Charmides and 'what is beauty?' in Hippias Major. This question we call here 'Socratic question' and probably is the very question the historical Socrates used to employ, is tightly interrelated with both his disavowal and his elenchus. He disclaims knowledge because he cannot find the answer to the question himself and he rejects others’ since they cannot offer the correct answer too. Every interlocutor can claim he knows X, if and only if he can answer the Socratic question. Otherwise, he is more of an ignorant than of a knower of τί ποτέ ἐστι X. Knowing the answer to this question is, thus, knowledge’s criterion for Socrates. Having found out that he cannot answer what it is which he would claim to know, the interlocutor comes to the point Socrates was there at the beginning. The least advantage of this circle is that he becomes as wise as Socrates does about the subject, becoming aware that he does not know it. At the end of the circle they are both still at the beginning, not knowing what X is. So let us first take a glance at these three elements. Socratic disavowal of knowledge is strictly asserted in some passages. At Apology 21b4-5, Socrates says: -/- I do not know of myself being wise at all (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν) -/- Moreover, at 21d4-6: -/- None of us knows anything worthwhile (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι) …. I do not know (οἶδα) neither do I think I know. -/- In Charmides Socrates speaks about a fear about his probable mistake of thinking that he knows (εἰδέναι) something when he does not (166d1-2). The somehow generalization of this disavowal can be seen in Gorgias. After calling his disavowal 'an account that is always the same' (509a4-5), Socrates continues (a5-7): -/- I say that I do not know (οἶδα) how these things are, but no one I have ever met, like now, who can say anything else without being absurd. -/- At the end of Hippias Major (304d7-8), Socrates affirms his disavowal of knowledge of 'what is X?' this time about the fine: -/- I do not know (οἶδα) what that is itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν). Some other passages, however, made a number of scholars dubious about Socrates’ disavowal. Vlastos mentions Apology 29b6-7 as an evidence : 'that to do wrong and to disobey one’s master, both god and men, I know (οἶδα) to be evil and shameful'. He thinks that if we give this single text 'its full weight' it can suffice to show that Socrates does claim knowledge of a moral truth (1985, 7). Vlastos’ claim is not admittable since it would be too strange, I think, for a man like Socrates to violate his disavowal claim just after emphasizing it. We can see his claim just before the already mentioned passage: -/- And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything it world be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge (οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς) of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have (οὐκ εἰδέναι) (Apology 29b1-6) Vlastos tries to solve what he calls the 'paradox' of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge distinguishing the 'certain' knowledge from 'elenctic' knowledge (1985, 11) and thinking that when Socrates avows knowledge, we must perceive it as an elenctic knowledge, a knowledge its content 'must be propositions he thinks elenctically justifiable' (ibid, 18). Irwin’s solution is the distinction of knowledge and belief. He approves that Socrates does not 'explicitly' make such a distinction, but still thinks that Socrates’ 'test for knowledge would make it reasonable for him to recognize true belief without knowledge, and his own claims are easily understood if they are claims to true belief alone' (1977, 40). While I agree with Vlastos up to a point, I strongly disagree with Irwin about the early dialogues. As I will try to show below, we are not permitted to consider any kind of distinction within knowledge in Socratic dialogues because only one category of knowledge is alluded to there and the distinction of knowledge and belief thoroughly belongs to the second Sorcates. Although no kind of distinction can be admittable here, I think Vlastos’ distinction can be accepted only if we regard it as a distinction between knowledge, which is unique and without any, even incomparable, rival, and a semi-idiomatic and ordinary one that is a necessary requirement for any argument, and thus, unavoidable even for someone who does not claim any kind of knowledge. An apparent evidence of this is Gorgias 505e6-506a4: -/- I go through the discussion as I think it is (ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν), if any of you do not agree with admissions I am making to myself, you must object and refute me. For I do not say what I say as I know (οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω) but as searching jointly with you (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν). -/- The minimal degree of knowledge everyone must have to take part in an argument, conduct it and use the phrase "I know" when it is necessary is what Socrates cannot deny. We can call it elenctic knowledge only if we agree that it is not the kind of knowledge that Socrates has always been searching, the one that can be accepted as the answer of Socratic 'what is X?' question. His disavowal of knowledge is applied only to the knowledge which can truly be the answer of Socratic question and pass the elenctic exam; a knowledge that, I believe, is never claimed by first Socrates. Socrates conducts his method of examining his interlocutors’ knowledge, our second element here, by almost the same method repeated in Socratic dialogues. That whether we are allowed to regard all the examinations of Socrates in the early dialogues as based on the same or not has been a matter of dispute. Vlastos himself (1994, 31) distinguished Euthydemas, Lysis, Menexenns and Hippias Major from the other Socratic dialogues because he thinks Socrates has lost his faith to elenchus in there. Irwin (1977, 38) distinguishes Apology and Crito where Socrates’ own convictions is present. Contrary to some scholars like Benson (2002, 107) who take elenchus in all the Socratic dialogues as a unique method, Michelle Carpenter and Ronald M. Polansky (2002, 89-100) argue pro the variety of methods of elenchus. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2002, 145-160) even reject such a thing as Socratic elenchus which can gather all of the Socrates’ various arguments under such a heading. There can be no solution for the problem of elenchus, they think, is due to 'the simple reason that there is no such thing as 'the Socratic elenchos"'(p.147). Though we consider elenchus a somehow determined process and a part of Socratic circle in the early dialogues, all we assume is that whatever differences it might have in different dialogues, it has the same onto-epistemological principles and, thus, we are not going to take it necessarily as a unique method. This method sets out to prove that the interlocutors are as ignorant as Socrates himself is. That whether elenchus is constructive, capable of establishing doctrines as Vlastos (1994) or Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 20-21) believe or not is another issue to which this paper is not to claim anything. What is crucial for our discussion here is that elenchus does not reach to the very knowledge Socrates is looking for. This is strictly against Irwin who thinks that not only elenchus leads to positive results, 'it should even yield knowledge to match Socrates’ conditions'(1977, 68, cf. 48). He does not explain where and how they really yield to that kind of knowledge. He explains his elenctic method in his apology in the court (Apology 21-22), that how he used to examine wise men, politicians, poets and all those who had the highest reputation for their knowledge and every time found that they have no knowledge. If we accept, as I strongly do, that Socrates’ disavowal of his knowledge is not irony, it might seem more reasonable to agree that the process that has that disavowal as its first step cannot be irony as well. The key of the circle which can explain why Socrates disclaims knowledge and how he can reject others’ claim of having any kind of knowledge lies in the third element, Socratic question. In Hippias Major (287c1-2), Socrates asks: 'Is it not by Justice that just people are Just? (ἆρ᾽ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι). He insists at 294b1 that they were searching for that by which (ᾧ) all beautiful things are beautiful (cf. b4-5, 8). At Euthyphro 6d10-11 it is said that the Socratic question is waiting for 'the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) by which (ᾧ) all the pious actions are pious; and at 6d11-e1: -/- Through one form (που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ) impious actions are impious and pious actions pious. -/- Since the X itself is that by which X is X, knowing 'X itself' is the only way of knowing X. It is probably because of this that Socrates makes the distinction between the ousia as a right answer to the question and effect as a wrong one: -/- I am afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is (τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν) you did not wish to make clear its nature itself (οὐσίαν … αὐτοῦ) to me, but you said some effect (πάθος) about it. (Euthp. 11a6-9) -/- 1. Knowledge of what X is Now it is time to look for the onto-epistemological principles of Socratic circle and its three elements. It cannot reasonably be expected from the first Socrates to present us explicitly and clearly formulated principles of his onto-epistemology when such explications cannot be found even in the second Socrates who has some obviously positive theoris. Since there must be some principles underlying this first systematic inqury of knowledge, we must seek to them and be satisfied with elicitation of the first Socratas’ principle. What will be drawn out as his principles cannot and must not, thus, be taken as very fix and dogmatic principles. Some very slightest principles and grounds suffice for our purposes here. The first principle that is the prima facie significance of the Socratic question and his implementation of all those elenctic arguments I call the principle of 'Knowledge of What X is' (KWX): -/- KWX To know X, it is required to know what X is. -/- Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b23-25, 27-29, 987b4-8) takes Plato’s τί ἐστι question as seeking the definition of a thing that is the same as historical Socrates’ search but applying to a different field. That Plato’s 'what is X?' question was a search for definition became the prevailed understanding of this question up to now. I am going neither to discuss the answer of Socratic question nor to challenge taking it as definition. What I am to insist is that knowledge is attached firmly to the answer of the question: Knowledge of X is not anything but the knowledge of what X is. It entails, certainly, the priority of this knowledge to any other kind of knowledge about X but it also has something more fundamental about the relation of knowledge and Socratic question. Socrates’ exclusive focus on the answer of his question can authorize the consideration of such an essential role for KWX in his epistemolgoy. The total rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are unable to answer the question can be regarded as a strong evidence for it. Socrates’ elenctic method and his rejection of others’ knowledge in the early dialogues, which all end aporetically with no one accepted as knower and nothing as knowledge, prevent us from finding any positive evidence for this. We have to be content, therefore, of negative evidences which, I think, can be found wherever Socrates rejects his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are not able to give an acceptable answer to his 'what is X?' question. 2. Bipolar Epistemology Socrates’ rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge has another epistemological principle as its basis. Let me call this principle Bipolar Epistemology' (BE): BE There is no third way besides knowledge and Ignorance. -/- BE says that about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and Ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. This means that BE is presupposed here. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The first Socrates never let anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is. -/- 3. Bipolar Ontology The principle of BE in first Socrates’ epistemology is parallel to another principle in his ontology. Plato’s bipolar distinction between being and not being is as strict and perfect as his distinction between knowledge and ignorance. This principle I shall call the principle of 'Bipolar Ontology' (BO): BO Being is and not being is not. BO is apparently the same with the well-known Parmenidean Principle of being and not being (cf. Diels-Kranz (DK) Fr. 2.2-5). Euthydemus’ statement against the possibility of false knowledge can be good evidence for this principle: -/- The things which are not surely do not exist (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα … ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν). (Euthydemus 284b3-4) -/- He continues (b4-5): -/- There is nowhere for not being to be there (οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἐστίν). -/- That BE does not let true opinion as a third option besides knowledge and ignorance seems to be related to BO’s rejecting a third option besides being and not being, which is itself the basis of the impossibility of false belief. Socrates’ elaborate discussion of the problem of false belief in Theatetus that leads to a more decisive discussion and finally to some solutions in Sophist can make our consideration of BO for the first group of dialogues authentive. -/- 4. &5. Split Knowledge and Split Being The fourth principle I shall call the principle of 'Split Knowledge' (SK): -/- SK Knowledge of X is separated from any other knowledge (of anything else) as if the whole knowledge is split to various parts. -/- This Principle is hinted and criticized as Socrates’ way of treating with knowledge in Hippias Major: -/- But Socrates, you do not contemplate the entireties of things, nor do people you have used to talk with (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). (301b2-4) -/- Contrary to Rankin who regards the passage as 'antilogical, almost eristic in tone rather than presenting a serious philosophy of being' (1983, 54), I think it can be taken as serious. Hippias criticizes Sorcates that he does not contemplate (σκοπεῖς) the entireties of things (ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων), a critique which Socrates is not its only subject but all those whom Socrates accustomed to talk with (ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). This last phrase, I think, extends this critic beyond this dialogue to other Socratic dialogues. Hippias’ use of the perfect tense of the verb ἔθω (to be accustomed) is a good evidence of this extension. We can get, thus, these ἐκεῖνοι as Socrates’ interlocutors in his other dialogues that hints that this criticism has the epistemological groundings of the previous dialogues as its subject. What ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι points to is that Hippias does not have in mind Socrates’ way of treating things only in this dialogue, but he is also criticizing Socrates’ way throughout his dialogues. At 301b4-5, Socrates and his interlocutors’ way of beholding things is described as such: -/- You people knock (κρούετε) at the fine and each of the beings (ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων) by taking each being cut up in pieces (κατατέμνοντες) in words (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). This leads us to our next principle that is parallel to, and the ontological side of, SK, the principle of 'Split Being'(SB): -/- SB Everything (being) is separated from any other thing as if the whole being is split to many beings. -/- Socrates and his interlocutors and thus, as we saw, the Socratic dialogues are accused to regard everything as it is separated from all other things. This separation is en tois logois that, I think, can reasonably be taken as saying that Socratic dialogues (it refers of course to the dialogues before Hippias Major) cut up all things which have the same name/definition from all other things and try to understand them separately, without considering other things that are not in their logos. They, for example in Hippias Major, are cutting up to kalon and try to understand what it and all others inside this logos are by separating it from all other things. This is directed straightly against Socratic question and the way Socratic dialogues follow to find its answer, every time separating one logos. As Meyer (1995, 85) points out, every question 'presupposes that the X in question in a logos is something' and 'every answer to every question aims at unity' (84). The critique of Hippias Major is, therefore, at the same time a critique of SK and SB. It is also a critique of KWX because it is only based on KWX that Socratic dialogues could search for the answer of 'what is X' question supposing that knowing what X is is enough for the knowledge of X. SK and KWX are absolutely interdependent. What Socrates and all his previous interlocutors have neglected in Socratic dialogues, Hippias says, was 'continuous bodies of being' (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας) (301b6). Either this theory actually belongs to the historical Hippias as it is being said or not, it is strictly criticizing SB. We have the same phrase with changing sūma to logos some lines later at 301e3-4: διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας. Although this theory that can be observed as both an ontological and an epistemological theory is rejected by Socrates (301cff.), it is still against first Socrates’ onto-epistemological principles and might let us look at what is rejected as Socratic prineple. -/- 6. Knowledge is of Being The sixth principle that I think is presupposed by the first Socrates, is the 'Knowledge of Being' Principle (KB): -/- KB Knowledge is of Being. -/- This principle is obviously the source of the problem of false knowledge, a very important problem throughout Plato’s philosophy. We face this problem maybe for the first time in Euthydemus. In less than 20 Stephanus’ pages, 276-295, we are encountered with different interwoven problems about knowledge , all grounded in the problem of false opinion. Having challenged the obvious possibility of telling lies at 283e, at 284 Euthydemus discusses it saying that the man who speaks is speaking about 'one of those things that are (ἓν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων)' (284a3) and thus speaks what is (λέγων τὸ ὄν) (a5). He must necessarily be saying truth when he is speaking what is because he who speaks what is (τὸ ὄν) and the things that are (τὰ ὄντα) speaks truth (τἀληθῆ λέγει) (a5-6). This is based on Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being which Euthydemus restates (284b3-4) and we mentioned discussing BO principle above. The things that are not are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) and there is no possibility for anyone to do (πράξειεν) anything with them because they must be made as being before anything else can be done, which is impossible (b5-7). The words, then, are of things that exist (εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι) (285e9) and as they are (ὡς ἔστιν) (e10). The result is that no one can speak of things as they are not. It is this impossibility of false speach that is extended to thinking (δοξάζειν) at 286d1 and leads to the impossibility of false opinion (ψευδής … δόξα) (286d4). The general conclusion is asserted at 287a extending this impossibility to actions and making any kind of mistake. Not only knowledge is of being but speech, thought and action are of being simply because of the fact that nothing can be of not being. -/- B. First Socrates’ Principles in the Middle Period Dialogues Out of what were presupposed or criticized mostly in five dialogues, Euthyphro, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Laches and Charmides, we tried to draw the first Socrates’ principles. Our inquiry here is directed to find out the fate of these principles in the three dialogues of the middle period, Meno, Phaedo and Republic. To do this, first we ought to check the situation of Socratic circle in these dialogues. The Socratic circle that was predominant in the early dialogues, does not look like a circle here anymore though they certainly have some features in common. Meno, Phaedo and Republic II-X are not committed to the principles of the circle and the whole circle in disrupted in them. The difference of the two Socrateses towards acquiring knowledge is obvious. The Socrates of Meno, Phaedo and Republic is evidently more self-confident that he can get to some truths during his arguments as he does. They are in their first appearance, as almost all other dialogues, committed to Socrates’ disavowal. All of them try to keep the shape of the Socratikoi Logoi genre, which is committed to the historical Socrates’ way of discussion; a dramatic personage who is to challenge his interlocutors, ask them and refuse the answers. Nevertheless, the fact is that what we have in common between two groups of dialogues is mostly a dramatic structure. Whereas the first group’s arguments are based on Socrates’ disavowal and lead to no positive results, the second group is decisively going to achieve some positive results. The aim of the first Socrates was to show others that they are ignorant of what they thought they knew. The new Socrates of Meno, on the opposite, makes so much efforts to show that the slave boy has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the things that he does not know (οἶδε) (85c6-7). Despite his lack of knowledge, he has true opinions nevertheless. The way from these true opinions to knowledge, as Socrates states, is not so long. These true opinions are now like a dream but 'can become knowledge of the same things not less accurate than anyone’s' (οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων) (c11-d1), if they be repeated by asking the same questions. The most outstanding text regarding Socrates’ disavowal is Meno 98b where he explicitly claims knowledge: -/- And indeed I also speak as (ὡς) one who does not know (εἰδὼς) but is guessing (εἰκάζων). However, [about the fact] that true opinion and knowledge are different, I do not altogether expect (δοκῶ) myself to be guessing (εἰκάζειν), but if I say about anything that I know (εἰδέναι) -which about few things I say- this is one of the things that I know (οἶδα). (98b1-5) This passage is very significant about Plato’s disavowal of knowledge. There can hardly be found, I think, anywhere else in Plato’s corpus where Socrates speaks about his knowledge of something as such. He says first that he speaks as someone who does not know. This ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω comparing with what he used to say in the first group, οὐκ οἶδα, has this added ὡς. Socrates does not claim strongly anymore that he does not know anything but speaks only as someone who does not know. He needs this ὡς not only because he is going to accept that he does know some, though few, things immediately after this sentence, but also because he needs his previous disavowal to be loosened from Meno on. He does not merely say here that he knows something. It is then different from the examples mentioned before which could be taken as idiomatic or at least not emphatic. Socrates’ remarkable emphasis on distinguishing εἰδέναι from εἰκάζειν departs it from all other passages where he says only he knows something. Moreover, he claims definitely that he has knowledge about few (ὀλίγα) things. From the early to the middle dialogues, Socrates’ attitude to knowledge has totally renewed its face. He brings forth a new concept, true opinion, and he does not speak of knowledge as he used to before; the rough, perfect and unachievable knowledge of the first group has turned to something more smooth, realistic and achievable. Comparing with the early dialogues that did not set out from the first to reach positive results, the middle ones are extraordinarily and surprisingly positive and hence destroy the basis of the Socratic circle. The questions and answers are purposely directed to some specific new theories; most of them are not directly related to the topics or the main questions of the dialogues. They are suggested when Socrates draws the attention of the interlocutor away from the main question because of the necessity of another discussion. Even if the main question remains unanswered, we have still many positive theories, prominently of metaphysical type. These theories are so abundant and dominant in these dialogues, especially Phaedo and Republic, that one might think that they may appear to be arbitrarily sandwiched in there. This helps dialogues to keep their original Socratic structure while they are suggesting new theories. Hence, the Socratic question of 'what is X?', though is still used to launch the discussion, is loosened and is forgotten for most part of the dialogues. Meno that has first a differently formulated question, 'can virtue be taught?', leads finally to the Socratic question of 'What is virtue?'. Phaedo is dedicated to the demonstration of the immortality of soul and the life after death without having a central Socratic question. The case of Republic is more complicated. The first book, on the one hand, has all the criteria of a Socratic circle: its 'what is justice?' question, Socrates’ strong disavowal (e.g. 337d-e), his rejection of all answers and coming back to the first point without finding out any answer. This Book, considered alone, is a perfect Socratic dialogue, as many scholars regard it as early and separated from other books. The books II-X are, on the other hand, far from implementing a Socratic circle. They have still the 'what is justice?' question as their incentive leading question, but they are, in most of the positive doctrines and methods that encompass the main parts, ignoring the question. Even these books that, I believe, are the farthest discussions from the Socratic circle are so cautious not to break the Socratic structure of the dialogue as long as it is possible. What is changed is not the structure of the dialogue but the ontological and epistemological grounds based on which new theories are suggested. -/- 1. Knowledge of the Good We can clearly see in the second group of dialogues that the KWX principle loses the place it had before in our first group. It is not, of course, rejected, but still we cannot say that it has the same situation. KWX that was based on Socratic question, as we discussed before, was the leading principle of the first Socrates’ epistemology and of the highest position. Other epistemological principles, SK directly and BE indirectly, were relying on Socratic question and therefore on KWX. Such a position does not belong to KWX from Meno on. What makes it different in the second Socrates is another principle that is needed it not only as its complementary principle but also as what is more fundamental. Plato, then, does not reject KWX in this period, but, it seems, he transcends to another more basic principle; a principle we shall call the principle of 'Knowledge of the Good' (KG): -/- KG Knowledge of X requires knowledge of the Good. -/- Whereas all the dialogues of our first group are free from any discuscon about KG, it bears a very important role in the second group so as becomes the superior principle of knowledge in Republic. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good separate from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8). What let us discuss KG as an epistemological principle for the second Secrates is the relation he tries to establish between knowledge and the Good which, though is alongside with the mentioned thesis and the idea of virtue as knowledge, goes much deeper inside epistemology asking to regard the Good as the basis of knowledge. The effort of Phaedo cannot succeed in establishing the Good as the criterion of explanation and knowledge since, I think, it needs a far more complicated ontology of Republic where Socrates can finally announce KG. What is said in Republic is totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7). The problem of our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any kind of knowledge: -/- The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6) -/- Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both aletheia and to on. He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the conclusion of the analogy: -/- That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας) so far as it is known (ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4) Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). KG, which had been implicitly contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. As what was quoted clearly proves, this principle is the very one which we can observe as the most fundamental principle of the second Socrates in Republic, corresponding to the role KWX had in the first Socrates. The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible realm (517c). -/- 2. Tripartite Epistemology BE is thoroughy rejected in the second Socrates and substituted by its opposite, the principle of 'Tripartite Epistemolgy' (TE): -/- TE Opinion is an epistemological status between knowledge and ignorance. BE of the first Socrates was denying any third way besides knowledge and ignorance which was the foundation of Socratic circle without which Socrates could not reject his interlocutors’ possessing any kind of knowledge. We cannot say, however, that the first Socrates had a third epistemological status in mind but rejected it. Such a status was unacceptable for him so that one can say that he would reject any kind of such status if suggested. There were only two possibilities about knowledge: either one knows something or he does not know it. TE, thus, was not the first Socrates’ discovery and, I think it is not the second Socrates’discovery. All we can see in our second group of dialouges is that he uses this principle as an already demonstrated one. Having examined the slave boy in Meno for the prupose of showing the working of recollection, it truns out that he has some opinions in him while he still does not know. Without trying to prove it, Socrates takes this as the distinction between knowledge and opinion: -/- So, he who does not know (οὐκ εἰδότι) about what he does not know (περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ) has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the same things he did not know (περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε) (85c6-7). -/- The same distinction is set between ὀρθὴν δόξαν and ἐπιστήμην at 97b5-6 ff. (also cf. 97b1-2: ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων … ἐπιστάμενος). He connects then their difference to the myth of Daedalus, the statue that would run away and escape. So are true opinions, not willing to remain long in mind and thus not worthy until one ties them down by αἰτίας λογισμῷ (98a3-4). Socrates says that this tying down is anamnesis. We face, in Phaedo, the same relation is settled between knowledge as the process of being tied down and getting the capability to give an account, on the one hand, and anamnesis, on the other hand. When a man knows, he must be able to give an account of what he knows (Phaedo 76b5-6) and since not all people are able to give such an account, those who recollect, recollect what once they learned (76c4). Although the distinction between knowledge and opinion is not explicitly used in Phaedo, referring to the parallel link between knowledge plus account and anamnesis in Phaedo and Meno, one can say that those who cannot recollect are not able to give account and, thus, are in a state of opinion. What is said at Phaedo 84a, though not yet a definite distinction between knowledge and opinion, makes a distinction between their objects so as we can agree that it is presupposed. The soul of the philosopher, Socrates says, follows reason, stays with it forever and contemplates the divine, which is not the object of opinoin (ἀδόξαστον) (84a8, cf. Meno 98b2-5). The distinction of knowledge and belief in Republic has a significant difference with what we discussed in Meno and Phaedo since the distinction of Meno was based on anamnesis and thus more an epistemological distinction. Even in Phaedo that we do not have any elaborate discussion about the distinction, the only hint to the matter at 76 is bound to the theory of anamnesis. In addition to the relation of the distinction with this theory, there is another evidence that does not permit us to consider the distinction as an ontological distinction. Let’s see Meno 85c6-7: -/- So, he who does not know about what he does not know has within himself true opinions about the same things he did not know (τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε). (85c6-7) -/- This last sentence persists that the objects of knowledge and true opinion are the same. What Socrates is to say here is that whereas he does not know X he has true opinion about the same X. I think Socrates’ sentence that the slave boy οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ and his restatement of it by saying περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε is because he wants to emphasize that the slave boy who does not know, has true opinion about the same thing. Socrates could say this just with using τούτων and there would be no necessity to bring περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ for οὐκ εἰδότι if he did not want to emphasize. -/- 3. Tripartite Ontology The distinction between knowledge and true opinion in Republic, on other side, has nothing to do with recollection, but is based on an ontological principle, 'Tripartite Ontology' (TO): -/- TO There are things that both are and are not. -/- This principle I confine, among our three dialogues of the second group, to Republic not extended to Meno and Phaedo, is obviously the opposite of BO. Speaking about the lovers of sights and sounds in the fifth book, Socrates distinguishes them from philosophers because their thought is unable to understand the nature of beautiful itself besides beautiful things (476a6-8) and hence they can only have opinions. The philosopher who, on the contrary, believes in beautiful itself and can distinguish it from beautiful things (476c9-d3), has knowledge because he knows, contrasting others who have opinion because they only opine (d5-6). Since those whose knowledge were degraded as opinion will complain about Socrates’ such calling their thought, he provides them the following argument (476e7-477b1): -/- - Does the person who knows, knows (γιγνώσκει) something (τὶ) or nothing (οὐδέν)? - He knows something (τί). - Something that is (ὂν) or is not (οὐκ ὄν)? - Something that is (ὂν) for how could something that is not be known (πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη)? - Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what completely is (παντελῶς ὂν) is completely knowable (παντελῶς γνωστόν) and what is in no way (μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ) is in every way unknowable (πάντῃ ἄγνωστον). - A most adequate one. - Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be (ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), won’t it be intermediate (μεταξὺ) between what purely is (εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος) and what in no way is (μηδαμῇ ὄντος)? - Yes, it’s intermediate. - Then as knowledge (γνῶσις) is set over what is (τῷ ὄντι), while ignorance (ἀγνωσία) is of necessity set over what is not (μὴ ὄντι) mustn’t we find an intermediate between ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) to be set over the intermediate, if there is such a thing? -/- From the third status of being we must reach to the third status of knowledge. The simple reading of this text can be an existential reading, taking the "is" of the mentioned sentences as existence. The problem is that when it is said that there is something that both is and is not reading "is" existentially, it sounds too bizarre to be acceptable. It cannot easily be understandable to have something as both existent and non-existent at the same time. This problem arose so many debates and led many scholars to reject the existential reading of "is" and suggest some other readings like predicative or veridical readings. I think though Plato’s complicated ontology of Republic cannot be correctly understood by a simple existential reading, this "is" cannot be free from existential sense of being and, thus, cannot be reduced to just a predicative or veridical sense of being. -/- 4. Bound Knowledges In addition to KG, the Good is also the basis of another principle in the second Socrates, namely the principle of 'Bound Knowledge' (BK): -/- BK Knowledge of everything is bound to the knowledge of the Good. -/- We distinguished BK from KG because we want to insist, in BK, on what had not been insisted upon in KG, that is, the binding role that the Good plays in the second Socrates, contrasting the absence of such a role in the first Socrates. Socrates remembers, in Phaedo, his wonderful keen on natural philosophers' wisdom when he was young. The origin of this enthusiasm was Socrates’ hope to know the cause of everything as they used to claim. When he was searching the matters of his interest on their basis, Socrates says, he became convinced he can get no acceptable answer from them and found himself blind even to the things he thought he knew before. One day he hears Anaxagoras’ theory that 'it is Mind that arranges and is the cause of everything (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (Phd. 97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14) and thinks that he can finally find what he has always expected, i.e. something which can explain all things. What I intend to show here is that what makes Socrates hopeful is that Anaxagoras’ theory tries 1) to explain all things by one thing and 2) this explanation is understood by Socrates as if it is based on the concept of the Good. That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In addition to διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing on the cause of all things (πάντα) which can clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully was its claim to provide the cause of all things by one thing. Another reason was that Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and Good belongs more to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ theory because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge we pointed to above are evidences of this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him like this: good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in the second sentence after introducing Mind: -/- I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best (βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5) This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better (ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3). What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him. We must insist that we are discussing what Socrates thought that Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). Socrates gives an example to show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good we chose as the name of BK principle: They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται). (99c5-6) -/- Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty which is precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). Moreover, BK is asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not only as a condition for the knowledge of X, as was noted above discussing KG, but also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good 'gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν)', he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This binding aspect of the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledges or all the objects of knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledges of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we observe Aristotle's assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars (e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστὶν, 988b4-6: τὸ τί ἢν εἶναί) of the Forms besides his statement that for them One is the Good (e.g., ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between the Good and unity may become more understandable. Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledges. The hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all kinds of knowledges by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) (511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and, thus, unified by. -/- 5. Bound Beings The ontological aspect of BK we shall call the principle of 'Bound Beings' (BB): -/- BB Being of all things are bound by the Good. -/- We saw in our principle of Split Being (SB) how the first Socrates was criticized because of his approach to split being and separate each thing from other things. The principle of Bound Beings intends to make the things more related, a duty which is done again by the Good. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that evidently and deliberately extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological scene: -/- You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4) -/- This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same role in the intelligible realm (b6-10): -/- Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known (γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ εἶναί) and their being (οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and power. That the Good is here represented as responsible for being of things in addition to their being known means, in my opinion, that Plato wants to posit BB in addition to BK. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can be taken as another evidence. The role of the Good, one might say, is confined to the intelligible realm because it is asserted that the role the Good plays in this realm is corresponding to that of the sun in the visible realm. The fact that Plato wants to observe the Good also as the ontological cause of the sensible things is obvious from his saying, in the allegory of Cave, that the Form of the Good 'produces light and its source (τὸν τούτου κύριον) [i.e. the sun] in the visible realm' (517c3). We can conclude, then, that the ontological function of the Good is not confined to the intelligible realm in which it is the lord and provides truth and understanding (c3-4) because it is also responsible to produce τὸν κύριον of light. 6. Proportionality of Being and Knowledge Insofaras BE and BO principles of the first Socrates gave way to TE and TO principles of the second Socrates, we cannot expect him to preserve KB in the same way as it was in the first Socrates. The new tripartite ontology and epistemology necessitates some modifications in KB which results in the principle of 'Proportionality of Being and Knowledge' (PBK): -/- PBK To every class of being there is a proportionate category of knowledge. -/- This principle, of course, does not entail the refutation of KB and thus is not kind of rejecting PBK but only a more complicated version of it. Based on PBK, we can still agree that knowledge is of being (KB) but the issue is that since none of the concepts of knowledge and being in the second Socrates are as simple as they were for the first Socrates, we need a more complicated principle for their relation here. Although from Meno 97a where the distinction of knowledge and true opinion is drawn out in the second group of the dialogues, we can expect a new relation, it is articulated in its most complete way in Republic and specifically in the allegory of Line. All the beings are divided there hierarchically to four classes, to each of them belongs a class of knowledge: imagination to images, belief to the sensible things (more correctly: the things of which they[in previous class] were images (ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν)), thought to mathematical objects (?) and understanding to the Forms and the first principle. The degree of clarity that each of the classes of knowledge shares in (σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν) is proportionate to the degree that its object shares in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχει). (511e2-4) -/- Conclusion From the six onto-epistemilogical principles of the first Socrates, four principles turn to their opposite in the middle period dialogues. While bipolar epistemology and ontology of the early dialogues give place to tripartite epistemology in the middle period dialogues and tripartite ontology in Republic, the split knowledge and being of the first Socrates are inclined to be substituted by bound knowledges and bound beings in the second Socrates and specifically in Republic. Not all our system of principles in this article is necessarily determinative. Either they are rightly formulated or not, our result would not be vulnerable if we accept that 1) making the distinction of knowledge and belief, 2) accepting the being of not being and 3) trying to bind both being and knowledge by the concept of the Good happens only in middle period dialogues, having been absent in the early ones. These are the favourite results all those somehow arbitrary and even oversimplified principles were to illustrate; that there is kind of a development in the epistemological as well as the ontological grounds of Plato’s philosophy. -/- Notes . (shrink)

Basic Predicate Logic, BQC, is a proper subsystem of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic, IQC. For every formula in the language {, , , , , , }, we associate two sequences of formulas 0,1,... and 0,1,... in the same language. We prove that for every sequent , there are natural numbers m, n, such that IQC , iff BQC n m. Some applications of this translation are mentioned.

Mu‘allâkâtların, tefsir, nahiv, sarf ve dil ilimlerindeki önemli rolünün yanı sıra Arap dili ve edebiyatı âleminde de yüksek ve önemli bir konumu bulunmaktadır. Cahiliye devri müfredatlarının pek çoğunu kapsamasından ötürü dil ve edebiyat erbabı ona önem atfetmiştir. Onlardan biri de, ‘Şerhü’l-Kasâ’idi’l-السبع’ adıyla el-Muâ‘llekât’a yaptığı şerhiyle Ebu Bekir Muhammed bin el-Kasım bin Beşar bin el-Anbari. Bu eserinde pek çok nahiv, zamirin aidiyeti, harflerin manası, zarf ile car ve mecrûrun bağlı olduğu yerin belirlenmesi, müfredatlarıni‘râbı, illetler arasındaki üstünlükler, kıyasa ve luğatta asıl olana, (...) kelimenin irabını belirlemede bazı seslerin etki nedenlerine, sarf, lügat, belağat, eleştiri vb. konulara değinmektedir. Bu itibarla bu araştırma, betimsel analitik yöntemini kullanarak et-Anbari’ninMu‘allâkât şerhindeki nahiv yöntemini, Arap nahiv ilminde iki önemli konu olan kıyas ve ta‘lîl ile ilgili duruşunu açıklayarak değerlendirmeyi hedeflemektedir. (shrink)

Thoughts of Raden Mas Panji Sosrokartono on Javanese spiritual philosophy.

Thoughts of Raden Mas Panji Sosrokartono on Javanese spiritual philosophy.